In late June, the United States intervened in the recently-termed “Twelve Day War” between Israel and Iran, striking three key Iranian nuclear facilities attempting to halt uranium enrichment. Though the strikes’ effectiveness remains in question, they likely set Iran’s nuclear program back at least modestly. Recently, France and the United Kingdom (U.N. Security council measures) have initiated ”snapback sanctions” on Iran as pressures mount to strike a deal — proving this issue will continue to perplex the international stage. However, the decision for U.S. intervention in the war set a dangerous precedent, reducing diplomatic negotiability while incentivizing Iran to expedite their nuclear program.
Though concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have transpired since the 1979 Revolution, Israel’s war in Gaza — decimating Iran-backed Hezbollah and Hamas — isolated the Islamic Republic as the only threat against Israeli hegemony in the Middle East, heightening fears of an Iranian bomb. In light of this, Iran rapidly increased uranium enrichment to weapons-grade levels, reportedly possessing just over 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. Israel’s pre-emptive strikes came just two weeks after this revelation, disrupting concurrent U.S. negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, culminating in the American airstrikes in early June.
However, American involvement in the war — and perhaps the war itself — was not their only course of action. Prior to the outbreak, diplomats from the United States and Iran had met for negotiations on a new nuclear deal following American withdrawal from the original JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the “Iran Nuclear Deal”). The two nations negotiated throughout the imposed 60-day deadline, with the U.S. reporting that the two nations were “close” to reaching a deal. Following the deadline’s passage, Israel struck Iran, disrupting the correspondence as Iran subsequently backed out from negotiations with the U.S. As American support for Israel’s strikes (and direct intervention) ensued, any hope for future negotiations became much more difficult as Iran could not trust the U.S. to operate in good faith.
As a nuclear Iran is against stated U.S. foreign policy — and given the cold history between the two countries — a deal allowing for any enrichment may serve as a launching pad for nuclear weapons, and thus the U.S. should give no leeway to the Islamic Republic regarding uranium enrichment. However, uranium enrichment is crucial for civilian nuclear infrastructure such as reactors, not only weapons. Iran — currently operating a reactor with another in construction — would not be able to operate future reactors, seriously harming their chances at nuclear power. As nuclear power is poised to become a dominant energy source in the 21st century, a no-enrichment deal would hinder the Iranian economy arguably more than the “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions currently imposed by the U.S. A deal allowing for zero enrichment is thus extremely unlikely to be accepted by Iran.
Though limited enrichment carries the fundamental risk of being a launch pad for a nuclear weapons program in the future, it is more likely to be accepted by the Iranians and less dangerous than an Iran unbeholden to U.S. and international inspection. Such was the case under the previous Iran deal (JCPOA), which greenlighted limited, civilian-level enrichment in exchange for an increase in nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency and limitations on their broader nuclear program and sanctions removal. President Donald Trump famously ended this deal after facing immense backlash from the Republican party,who at that time controlled the Oval Office and Congress.
That deal was still preferable to no deal at all. If the national interest is peace, as Vice President J.D. Vance (perhaps ironically) claimed following American airstrikes, then ensuring Iran remains under U.S. and European jurisdiction under a deal which may permit limited enrichment is far more efficient — especially when compared to the risk of inversely pushing Iran towards a nuclear bomb through greenlighted Israeli strikes or strikes from the U.S. itself. Israel’s and the U.S.’ talk of “regime change” only pushes Iran closer to a weapon for the Ayatollah’s — and perhaps the nation as a whole’s — survival.
Diplomacy with Iran since the end of the war has remained uncertain, yet it is apparent that the U.S. is not in the leveraging position it once held prior to the war. It was extremely difficult to imagine an Iran entirely cease nuclear enrichment — seemingly non-negotiable for the U.S. — prior to American strikes, and with the inconstancy of Israeli or American attacks that likelihood has greatly diminished. As the aftermath of the attacks reveal only a modest-if-light setback to potential Iranian nuclear weapons, they are only incentivized further to pursue a nuclear weapon if future attacks remain possible.
Despite their questionable effects on the Iranian nuclear program itself, the American strikes actually gave credence to Iran’s purported nuclear strategy. That strategy, known as “nuclear hedging,” is a method by which the Islamic State would maintain the ability to produce a nuclear weapon — via stockpiling enriched uranium — without doing so unless some existential threat to Iran or its regime were to make itself known. Calls for ‘regime change’ would classify as an existential threat, and the U.S. strikes on nuclear facilities have underscored many Iranians’ understandable fear of American firepower. Under nuclear hedging, strikes would seem to confirm the exact threat which would push Iran to actually pursue a bomb for its own survival.
Some critics argue that any diplomacy with Iran is ill-fated. In their view, Iran is a “rogue state” wholly incapable of negotiation and is either a hotbed for terrorism or a terrorist state itself. Any allowance of uranium enrichment to the country notorious for chanting “death to America” would thus be disastrous foreign policy, and such chants — and sponsorship of terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah — entirely justify not only U.S. attacks on their nuclear program but even American-backed regime change akin to the the war in Iraq.
This version of diplomacy (or lack thereof) is incredibly dangerous. The premature haste for full-scale war is particularly concerning, as American regime change wars — especially to prevent a nation from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) — do not have a good track record. In Iraq, the goal of toppling Saddam and his WMD program facilitated the upbringing of ISIS and granted Iran greater hegemony over the region. Domestically, the war cost 4,500 American lives and upwards of $3 trillion. Americans, seeing these dramatic costs, are understandably hesitant of bombing (or entering an all-too-familiar war with) an Iran arguably more powerful than 2003 Iraq.
Iran’s rogue state classification does not justify abandonment of negotiation. Negotiations, as previously mentioned, did occur under the JCPOA successfully — it was only after U.S. withdrawal that Iran ceased compliance.
It would not have been wise to pursue a regime change war in 1946 against the rapidly nuclearizing USSR, whose leader had just insinuated that war with the U.S. was “inevitable.” It is not worth causing death and harm to American forces for regime change based upon a potential for nuclearization, knowing that history shows the consequences are unpredictable. Iran’s sponsorship of terrorist organizations is indeed a reason to be hesitant of negotiations, but as previously mentioned, Hamas and Hezbollah have been thoroughly weakened and currently pose little threat to Israel’s security.
The American strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have had only one clear effect: disrupting diplomacy and further reducing hope for a nuclear deal in the U.S.’ interest. They have made Iran all the more skeptical of the U.S. and reduced the already slim chance of the sought-after no-enrichment plan. The strikes’ uncertain damage to the facilities themselves has only pushed Iranian potential nuclearization back by a few years at most. Given American willingness to not only back Israel’s missile barrages but covertly bomb their facilities themselves, Iran has little reason to placate U.S. policy that erratically switches between a deal-making facade and war-hawking. As tensions begin to heat up once again between Iran and Israel, the necessity for a new nuclear deal that can solidify peace becomes urgent— the U.S. strikes have only made this more implausible.